

1

In my view, the transcendence of the object in Husserl should be grasped in terms of time. As you walk around the object, what you see in terms of adumbrations is constantly changing, but you know that you are looking at the same object. So the transcendence of the object involves its “infinitude.” You are never finished “drinking it” with your eyes. That object is not exhausted in any finite series of profiles. Others too can see the object from this or that position, in this or that lighting. I think the conceptuality of the object (its ideal unity) is involved here.

2

Husserl is explicitly against the idea (associated with Kant) that there is some kind of reality-in-itself that hides behind possible and actual experience. But Husserl is very much aware that the world includes stuff we haven't seen yet and stuff that we can see in more clarity. Even the transcendent object is experienced “immediately” as having unseen sides. We know right away that the house we are looking at has a back side that we don't presently see. Husserl's thinking on time becomes very important in all this. And Heidegger took off from it. The “now” is never a pure instant. It is essentially stretched and smeared. Husserl may have got this from William James, whose *Principles of Psychology* can be read as first-rate phenomenology.

3

To me Husserl is fairly obscure on the issue of bracketing. I recently tried an interpretation in terms of practicality. I think both of us are pretty serious about *being* philosophers ourselves, so (in my view) this might be an opportunity for us both (in our own way) to figure out just what kind of bracketing is important here. (Note: I know that Husserl meant something more complicated than the style of bracketing that I've called “Machian” after Ernst Mach recently.)

4

...if we visualize knowledge or the epistemic as a web, then focusing in on some cluster within this web necessarily occurs against

another portion of the web, which acts as the (covariant) background (for this act of focusing)...

I completely agree with this, and I made a similar point in a conversation about Wittgenstein once. When we do any kind of semantic investigation (in others philosophy), we have to rely on words that we take for granted. We have to use our “background” skill with most of the network to talk about (focus on) the foregrounded part of the network.

What you right above also is a nice example of profiles or adumbrations. The entire conceptual epistemic network cannot be grasped at once. One can grasp it is a unity, but one can only look at it from this “side” or that “side” at any one moment.

5

Lifeworld. Yes this seems like the crucial concept. Confused dualisms, like greasy knots, are untied. What’s left is the familiar world which is *seen for the first time by theory*. Heidegger (following Hegel) brilliantly reminds us that the “familiar” is just what we understand least, like something too close for our eyes to focus on. To explicate the given. To unfold it. Husserl later in his career starts to really think about historical “sediment.” Heidegger calls this “crust” **interpret-
edness**. It is the hackneyed generic self, the “tribal” average collective consciousness, the default background, the mud in which philosophy must be born. Falling immersion is our tendency to go with the idiotic but warm and safe flow.

There is definitely an ethical charge to Heidegger’s talk on this, but there is also just detached clinical accuracy. We are thrown into what W calls “a form of life,” and this “software” is the living liquid slowly evolving intelligible structure of the lifeworld (marriages and promises and protons.) The latest large language models, trained on the entire internet, dubbed “stochastic parrots”, are Heidegger’s “Anyone” or “One” come to (artificial) “life”.

I would say that the ontic world in itself is forever an unreachable limit to anything we can say about it, but that sure, we can say that we grasp the world in experience by acknowledging at the same time that it is epistemically ungraspable.

I think I responded to this already on Reddit. But let's get more into it. If you mean that a **perfect** or **final** grasp is merely an ideal limit, never actually reached, then that is close to my view (and Husserl's). We can always get a better view. We can always "zoom in" still more.

If you mean that nothing is perfectly certain, then I pretty much agree, except that "a forum is presupposed." We cannot doubt the framework that makes (serious, scientific) doubt possible and intelligible. (I am a **minimal** foundationalist.)

If you mean that reality "in its flow" cannot be "grasped" in static concepts, then I partially agree. One cannot paint music. Concepts are mere one channel of reality. Reality is also emotion, color, noise, etc. There's a great Nietzsche quote on this in *The Antichrist*.

...he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as "truths" ... he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables... ... The "kingdom of heaven" is a state of the heart—not something to come "beyond the world" or "after death." .. The "kingdom of God" is not something that men wait for: it had no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it is not going to come at a "millennium"—it is an experience of the heart, it is everywhere and it is nowhere.... ... This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae. ...It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya, and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—With a little freedom in the use of words, one might actually call Jesus a "free spirit"—he cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth, whatever is established killeth. The idea of "life" as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of

word, formula, law, belief and dogma

That's one of my favorite quote in philosophy.

Perhaps we share an intuition ? Of being “behind” or “above” conceptuality ? Is it a sense of the “dynamic” ? Of reality as “process” ?

7

One thing we haven't talked about much is metaphor or myth. Derrida's *White Mythology* is brilliant on this. Our concepts all have a metaphorical basis. So, in a sense, we are still just trading hieroglyphs or images. We pour these images into one another's ears (liquifying them in the temporal delivery of sound, so that space becomes time.) Paul de Man is also great on this in *Blindness and Insight*. Popper was aware of it.

Science and philosophy are still poetic and mythological, but there is a difference, in my view. Ours is a second-order self-consciously autonomous and self-critical tradition. The only sacred myth is that of impious philosophy itself. In other words, only rationality itself in its radical corrosive autonomy is sacred. And our “pre-ontological” understanding of rationality, like that of being, is always blurry and inherited, so that rationality is a “circular” **self-explicating** entity. But it has “only” metaphors to work with. And yet what **is** metaphor exactly ?