

1

The world is the system of its **sides**. Each of these **sides** is the entire stream of experience of some sentient organism within that world. The organism is part of and also the center of the **side** associated with it. The rest of the **side** is “spread out around” the sense organs of the organism. It is the “world” of that organism, in the middle of which it finds itself.

2

The same object often appears many times in a particular **side**. In other words, a sentient organism often experiences the same object more than once, differently each time, and yet **as** the same object.

An object is “spread out over time,” even if is experienced only once, for grasping the object as such includes grasping its possible reappearance.

Spatial objects are especially useful examples, because they can never be completely present (for the eyes) all at once. Instead they show themselves gradually, and only through aspects that occlude one another.

For instance, I cannot see the heads side and the tails side of a coin “at once.” To see both sides of the coin “takes time.” I have to turn it around in my hand, and the whole of the coin is never present for the eyes. Yet either side is grasped as part of the whole, so the coin is a **logical unity**. I typically see this or that side of the coin without noticing the side, because I just need the coin as a unity for a parking meter.

The coin is also a **temporal synthesis**, because grasped as if the “moment” of its appearing as heads is **glued** to the “moment” of its appearing as tails.

With this in mind, we can say that the **moments** of spatial objects are its aspects, its adumbrations, its sides. But this **moment** metaphor is more general than the visually oriented aspect metaphor. So I’ll use **moment** as generalization of aspect, picked to emphasize that all intention objects, not just spatial objects, are logical unities and temporal syntheses.

For example, I can return the “same” book every few years, and I will

encounter different **moments** of that same book. I will “see it in a new light.” The book remains open for possible encounters. I understand it not only in terms of what it has been but also in terms of what it might be.

Even a concept gives itself as (exists as or through) its **moments**. As a philosopher, I might occasionally “see” the concept of perception “in a new light.”

3

We have discussed the **moments** of the same object being “spread out over time” in a particular **side** of the world, which is to say in the experience of the particular sentient organism associated with that **side**.

But philosophical discussion requires its participants to share both a world and a language. An **ideal communication community** is presupposed by the project of science. We must therefore account for the interaction of **sides** and their associated sentient organisms.

Objects in the world “scatter their **moments**” over many **sides** of the world. This is as mundane as two people in the kitchen looking at the same tomato. Different **moments** of that tomato appear in both streams. The two people can both talk about **the** tomato.

Language is “apriori world-directed and transpersonal.” Imperfectly but sufficiently shared logical-semantic norms are an essential aspect of the **ideal communication community**. The linguistic self is an “avatar” or “citizen” of a forum, a space of assembly, which is always tacitly presupposed by those engaging in rational inquiry as such. In other words, rationality is a rich concept with many aspects, and the “presupposed forum” of the **ideal communication community** is an especially important aspect that often functions “transparently.” It is like the water we swim, easily forgotten.

One reason to reject and replace indirect realism is its tacit misunderstanding of the subject as an entity locked in the skull’s control room, with only a private screen as (possibly) a representation of a world that is (hopefully) there, although definitely uncertain and inaccessible.

While I don’t deny the possibility of insane fears that one is the only sentient organism in a world that is therefore a “dream,” I do exclude

ontological theories that deny “the forum” required for them to **be** ontological theories in the first place. The conditions for the possibility of ontology are tacit assumptions of the ontologist, latent in the “heroic” self-conception of the great scientific mind. The desire to be recognized is close, but the desire to deserve recognition is closer. This “transpersonal normativity” is the yeast that makes the bread rise. Ethics is part of first philosophy, because the concept of philosophy is primarily normative, inasmuch, for instance, as it is distinguished from a careless or fanatical/dogmatic expression of belief.

4

Because we share logical-semantic norms, imperfectly but sufficiently, we can talk about the same objects, and we understand these objects to be “public” in the sense that the objects exist as **moments** in many “sides” of the world. In other words, we experience and talk about the same objects differently.

Each sentient organism’s stream of experience is a **side** of the world. The world has its being exclusively in such sides. So each “side” is not representation but (a piece of) the world itself. The sentient organism “swims” in reality, as part of that reality.

Representation still makes sense in the limited context of signitive as opposed to fulfilled intentions, as in Husserl. I can discuss the possibility of a letter in the mailbox. Then I can actually look in the mailbox. Wittgenstein’s picture theory seems to work here. The key point is that the real world, the lifeworld, is already “organized” and “significant.” I can “read off” or “see immediately” that “the cat knocked over her food.” Perhaps a moment ago I heard a commotion, so I walked downstairs check, expecting to find that the cat did this. I represent the possibility to myself and have it confirmed through perception. But the perception itself is not a representation. This point is a bit of a digression, but I suspect the genuine validity of the representational approach within its proper sphere tempts people to misunderstand perception as representation.