

Schrödinger is what I'd call an "ontological perspectivist." He claims that we are all "aspects of the one." We can read this in terms of Wittgenstein's "philosophical I." It's not the linguistic-empirical ego which is an aspect of the world, for such egos are "in" the world. Instead it's the whole structured sensual stream of experience that is an aspect of the world. But since there is no deep subject, but only the empirical subject, "experience" is a somewhat misleading word. It's a ladder that should be pushed away when it has done its job.

Mach's work implies a similar ontological perspectivism, but he doesn't apply his first-person result to "the forum" (the world of others, with whom we converse, in order to do philosophy and science.) But Mach did achieve the necessary "flat" ontology. So-called inner things and so-called outer things were all just there, and there were functional relationships to be explored.

The "forum" is a minimally specified version of the world. It's what philosophy as such cannot deny and at least tacitly presupposes. It is the "space for assembly." Whatever the case may be, we philosophers, as such, must all exist together and be able to talk about our shared situation. Or philosophy as a project makes no sense. And one can avoid philosophy. But one cannot claim the impossibility of theory (deny the forum) in a seriously theoretical way.

It's a recognition of the necessity of the forum that motivates the move from Wittgenstein's "I am my world" to a perspectivism that understands each of us to be an aspect of the *same* world. My linguistic self is in the piece of the world that my "ontological self" **is**. My "life stream" worlds an aspect of the world. The world exists as a plurality of such aspectual streams. So the same object (the Eiffel tower) appears in many streams.

Apparently every stream is associated with a sentient creature at its center. Objects are, in their visual aspect, "through" or "for" my eyes, though my eyes do not appear in the visual field. But I learn to associate this field with my eyes, which I can see in the mirror or through photographs.

Many of the logical positivists, following Hume and Mill, were implicitly ontological perspectivists. But, like most philosophers, they didn't think much outside this methodological solipsism. Perhaps they thought the last move, to perspectivism, was obvious. And it is obvious. And yet **ontological** perspectivism has not been much discussed. The softer version of perspectivism was made famous by Nietzsche, but the crucial move is the identification of the being of the world and the being of experience. The world exist only in and through its aspects, the streams of experience, which are not experience really since **there is no** transcendental subject. Unless one identifies that "subject" with world, as one of its flowing aspects.