

1

Phenomenal “consciousness” is better understood as a “neutral” stream that is *prior to* its division into subject and object. I will therefore use “phenomenal *stream*.”

Blouin finds this “ontological phenomenism” in the mature Husserl (paper here). Blouin gives an excellent description of such phenomenism in that paper, which I endorse and accept, so here I will concentrate on the “global” implications of this “local” (first-person) description. Phenomenalists like Mill and Mach do not much discuss the conception of the world implied by the emphatic denial of things somehow hidden outside of or behind experience.

2

Mill doesn't completely ignore this issue. He needs to plausibly replace matter.

we do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: they remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions with which our presence has in general nothing to do. And more than all—they are, and will be after we have ceased to feel, Permanent Possibilities of sensation *to other beings than ourselves*.

In other words, the same objects appear in different phenomenal streams. I lose my keys in your couch. Later you find them and bring them to me. To say there's a chair in my room means that it'll be there if we check. And so on. A whiff of inferentialism already in the air.

From Husserl we get a much more detailed understanding of the way that spatial objects are given in/as *adumbrations*, which are profiles or aspects, the faces or facets of the object from this or that side of the room, by candlelight or sunlight. The same object has many faces, and these faces can flow into one another as one walks around the object, keeping an eye on it. Each aspect or face of the object occludes or conceals all the others. So the object

hides itself as it shows itself. The aspect or face of the object for you on your side of the room is not the aspect or face of the object for me on my side of the room.

But both of us “move through time” and remember the different faces that object has shown us. The object as such is logically fixed as a “temporal synthesis” of aspects it has shown *and might still show*. The object, as Mill already saw, is at least as much possibility as actuality, at least as much what it might do as what it has done. ( Again, latent inferentialism. )

The object shows one face or aspect at a time. For this reason, we might refer to these aspects as moments. Since only some objects are given spatially in a prominent way, while all are given temporally, the term “moment” might be more appropriate in its generality.

Do I understand the phenomenal stream of the other in terms of aspects of objects that are familiar to me? I remember what things looked like over there. I imagine what things look like for you over there. My own phenomenal stream is an unrolling contexture in which such aspects are embedded. We can project some variation of this stream on others, well aware that the same objects, including complicating entities like ontological phenomenalism in Husserl, show different faces to different people. We might say that different faces or aspects of the same worldly entities appear in the different streams, as genuine portions of the being of that stream.

Crucially —and Mill already saw this — the object is not more than these aspects or faces. The object is the temporal synthesis of its adumbrations, appearings, faces, sides. It is also their logical unity. The aspects are only aspects *through* this synthesis, as parts are only parts if understood in terms of a whole.

We might also note that objects, as always involving possible adumbrations, are “transcendent.” They are never finally consumed by perception or exhaustively presented. The entity “needs time” to manifest itself. Time peels or denudes the object. The phenom-

enal stream is a striptease. Existence (being) is time, with time understood as the variable unrolling situation which is nothing in particular, and yet always this unrolling or discoveriture itself, otherwise unspecified. Time is the nothingness of every entity. The nothingness and yet the passing, streaming, insubstantial being. In other words, to say that existence is time is to return to our original stream metaphor, along with the ontological phenomenalism that rejects any other kind of being (outside of the stream) as nonsense.

### 3

Husserl's conception of the transcendent object as given in adumbrations can be generalized so that the world itself is the object and we, considered not as persons but as our entire associated phenomenal streams, are the adumbrations.

Each phenomenal stream is a "side" or "aspect" of the world. The world is nothing more than these "sides," these streaming aspects. It has "all of its being" in such "aspects." In other words, reality is exactly the plurality of these phenomenal streams.

We know that Husserl appreciated Leibniz. I'd be grateful for anyone who might know if/where Husserl deals with this stretch from *The Monadology*.

And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects ; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.

A representational approach to perception implies a private "image-universe" for each perceiver. The "actual" universe is hidden by its own mediated appearing. Note how this echoes the way that aspects occlude aspects, and that Leibniz sees and emphasizes that it is **aspect rather than representation** that does justice to

our differing experience of the world *without* losing the crucial fact that we share that world logically. Philosophy *presupposes* our sharing a world through a shared logic.

Combining Leibniz with Mill, we can understand the world (all of reality) as a “system” of (“entangled”) phenomenal streams. And these streams are unrolling contextures in which are embedded the scattered moments of the entities in the world. We who share in a world and in a logic have basically the same entities, but we have different moments or aspects of those entities. We might compare phenomenal streams to melodies, entities to instruments, and moments/aspects to notes.

I, as embodied, responsible-for-my-claims-and-deeds **person**, appear at the center of what is therefore “my” stream. My beliefs articulate its “structure.” I “live in” these “liquid” (evolving, tentative) beliefs, which is the point of the redundancy theory of truth. On the other hand, as phenomenal stream or “ontological ego”, “I” include both myself as person *and* the situation in which I find myself. The “ontological ego” **is** (a facet of ) the world. In the Leibniz analogy, I am a “side” of the town, and the town has “all of its being” in such sides.

4

These phenomenal streams are streamings *of **the** world*. This is phenomenology or rather phenomenalism without consciousness.