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Those who claim that all is “mind” are trying to express the “first-person-ness” of the world. A sophisticated version of this idealism understands the world as a system of entangled “first-personal” streams.

2

Such idealism grasps the “shape” of the world, but it ignores the “world-directedness” of consciousness or mind. Language is about **the** world.

3

The ontological forum (also described as the ontological horizon) is the minimally specified concept of this single, shared “space of assembly.” The project of ontology (of “scientific” philosophy) tacitly presupposes its enabling conditions.

4

Idealism’s concept of mind or consciousness must therefore be a “public” concept. Shared and binding semantic and inferential norms are presupposed by the ontologist *as such*.

5

My lumbago may have a private aspect, but is an entity very much “in” the world in a logical sense. I can use it as an excuse. It can figure in our inferences.

6

Even medium-sized dry goods are “given” in private aspects. This is part of the first-person-ness of the world. But such objects are of course “in” the world. Logic “glues together” private aspects, “over” the phenomenal streams in which they appear—and over the time “in” which they come and go. The object as logical unity is a temporal and interpersonal synthesis.

7

While it evolves from the basic insight of idealism, a mature phenomenism is “neutral.” Traditionally mental entities are within the *now-restored* (life)world.

8

The “metaphysical subject” or “pure witness” is emptied so that the lifeworld can be repopulated.

9

This recovery of the lifeworld isn’t necessary for the idealist who never let it go. What the idealist lacks is a coherent story about our sharing of this world despite its first-personal shape. The aspect approach to objects, in the context of a system of neutral phenomenal streams, solves this problem, without losing idealism’s basic insight. But at the cost of the sentimental, subjective bias of its terminology.

10

The physicalist, on the other hand, lacks a coherent story about how physicalism itself can be intelligible and meaningful apart from a context it deems unreal. The physicalist denies or ignores the “first-person-ness” of the world. The normativity of rational inquiry is also left hanging, presumably reducible to the physical, even while ideally justifying such a reduction.