

The “transcendence” of the entity in Husserl is “logical” or “intentional.”¹ The same object *endures*, showing different “sides” of itself. An automatic “intentional logic” “holds” different appearances as appearances *of* the same object.

The object “reveals itself” “over” time. The song *cannot* be sung instantaneously, nor the book read. Nor can I get to know Sally without spanning time with her.

This is one way that the object “transcends” the present. It “goes beyond” or “spills over” the present. Here I mean the temporal present, but given our embodiment, the spatial present is relevant too.

That’s because the object also transcends or “spills over” what I have happened to “see” of it. To intend the object is to intend the object also for others.

This is because logic is *fundamentally* “transpersonal.” As a “logical” being, I am “tribal software” first and “me” only second. To be “logical-rational me,” I have to have downloaded this “software” — have learned to speak and think, even if only to myself.

The *spatially* present is what is near *me* (my body.) So the “intentional object” (in this example the spatial thing) spills over the spatial present too. Even if it is created in front of me, and so far remains close, I can talk to you about it on the phone. So you can intend

¹My goal is to point beyond the terminology to the experience of the reader.

something that isn't spatially present. And I intend it "for you" in the first place as much as I do "for me."

So the "intentional entity," which is just some mundane thing perhaps like a coffee cup, is never "completely" present. What *is* (relatively) completely present is an aspect or moment of that entity, an "appearance" of that entity. I say "relatively" because we can also intend or thematize this appearance so that *it* becomes the (new) intentional object.

Once this happens, it too becomes elusively non-present, only partially present, precisely because it's been "named" or *intended*. In the same way, an historical event can be referred to and reinterpreted endlessly. The event can be re-presented, made present again, but each time showing a different "aspect" of itself.

We experience this sort of thing all the time. We dwell on success and defeats. We recall situations, finding something new in them, such as their relation to yet other recalled situations.

Graham Harman takes Heidegger's basic thought to be that being is not presence. In other words, things "transcend" or "spill over" the present, so that they are only ever partially given. This is sometimes expressed as "being is time," and elsewhere I explain that statement, which is otherwise more obscure than what it "encodes." Roughly, it means that what exists is streams of "experience," and this "experience" is the "showing-hiding" of entities. What is shown-hidden changes, but this "structure" of showing-hiding endures, is itself always "present."

In other words, I “am” time, when considered as the entire streaming of my “experience.” But this “experience” is the actual “being” of the entities of the world, not their “representation.” So “experience” or “consciousness” points us in the right direction, but what’s intended is the world itself, although given in a “first-personal” *way*.

So each “first-person” phenomenal stream is “subject-like substance.” The world is “made of” *only* these “entangled” streams.

Intentional entities, which we can intend because we have “download” the “tribal software,” are for-others as much as they are for-us. Their aspects “express” the “first person” manner of these streamings of the world. While the eye is not itself in the visual field, something like a virtual eye is “implied” by a given aspect.

Early ontologists were confused by this into postulating a representational consciousness “on top of” a “physical” substrate. If objects looked big and then small (offered smaller and larger appearances), this implied (in their view) that such appearances were representational. Because the “real” object surely had a fixed “actual” size. This is probably because they prioritized tactile sensation, presumably for practical reasons. (One can imagine them doubting touch instead of vision, since the eyes clearly showed that objects had no fixed size.)

The dualism they created caused more problems than

it solved, but it's still the default ontology of many people. They then have "the hard problem of consciousness." How does this elusive "subjective" consciousness stuff emerge from and relate to the substrate? The "perspectival" in "perspectival phenomenism" specifically addresses that, and I was personally delight when I finally understood this kind of phenomenism, which (under the newish name) is an old idea.

Phenomenism doesn't "believe in" consciousness to begin with. Or rather it was reaction against the confusion of dualism that returned to the drawing board. Not does it accept some kind of substrate, which consciousness is supposed to somehow represent. Phenomenism accepts the "scientific image" *as* an image. As a "deworlding" that functions like an X-ray of experience, ignoring everything but the relevant "bones."

This brief essay is just an intro to "perspectival phenomenism." I go into more detail in many other essays.