

1

Belief is primary. Belief is irreducible. Truth is derivative. Truth merely facilitates the discussion of belief. I call “true” those beliefs that I share. The rest is mystification. For me to say so is to express belief. I may or may not *also* try to present this belief as one that ought to be adopted or endorsed by others.

2

Belief is the “structure” of the-world-from-a-point-of-view. (Understanding the “aspectual phenomenalism” discussed in my other papers is helpful here.) We “live in” our beliefs in the sense that there is nothing “deeper than” or “under” them. What startles me, and what I perceive as a snake in one moment, may be perceived as a piece of rope in the next. The leaf of one moment may be the camouflaged insect of a following moment. Beliefs are replaced by other beliefs. Talk of truth only gets in the way here.

3

This world-from-a-point-of-view or world-for is an “already meaningful” unrolling, practical context. The believer may “find words for” the significance of this “pre-articulated” context.

4

I believe with more or less confidence or intensity. The-world-for-me is, in certain respects, uncertain and indeterminate in a *positive* sense. I **live in** possibility and ambiguity. They are “there” in the “lived situation.” (His wife *might* be sleeping with that “friend” of hers. He could only make partial sense of some overheard snippets of conversation.)

5

The perception of a situation is that situation's "presence" here (spatially) and now (temporally). There's a package on the porch from Amazon. I see it. Or I recognize my dentist in the grocery store. He's got his hand on a ribeye.

6

I can describe a situation that I am not now perceiving. I can re-present what I have ceased to perceive. I can also predict or "pre-present" what I expect to be perceived by myself or others.

7

The metaphor of representation is appropriate here, however inappropriate elsewhere. Imagination represents actual or possible perception. What Husserl calls a "signitive intention" can be "fulfilled" by a perception. Language can picture all that might happen. Perception informs us of what *is* happening, though never in some final way that a further perception cannot revise.

8

Indirect realism, confused by the physiology of the nervous system, misunderstands *perception itself* as a representation. For the indirect realist, perceptions are "mental" symbols for the non-mental entities postulated by physicists. Or for an X that evades our cognition *by definition*. In the first case, they mistake a dependent layer of the lifeworld for its substrate. In the second case, we have still-born phenomenism, where only a vanishing residue is left outside of the subject, simply because the assumption that cognition is representation requires a represented.

9

Consider an especially phenomenalist passage in Kant.

That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future time. For that which stands in connection with a perception according to the laws of the progress of experience is real. They are therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical connection with my actual or real consciousness, although they are not in themselves real, that is, apart from the progress of experience.

Taken out of context, this is nice summary of J. S. Mill's phenomenalism.