1

Phenomenology is a **foregrounding description** of the universal situation (the world or ontological forum). Here I paraphrase/interpret Husserl and Heidegger on the issue of what things *are*.

$\mathbf{2}$

Adumbrations are aspects, profiles, facets. Adumbrations are objects-from-a-point-ofview. Adumbrations are "parts" of the object in that sense. It's only because we grasp the adumbrations as synthesized that they can be adumbrations **of** some object.

3

We tend to grasp the adumbration *as* the object. The object is only ever given in such adumbrations, so it's not as if we are *choosing* to take the part for the whole. In practical situations, it's rarely important how the object is known to be in the proper place but only **that** it is so known. Phenomenology's foregrounding description "swims upstream", reversing the practical priority of the given over its giving. For phenomenology, the giving is itself thematized –is the focus of care.

$\mathbf{4}$

The object transcends any of its adumbrations. It is "more than" or "beyond" what is has shown of itself so far. Or what it has shown just to me or just to you. It is "transcendent" in this sense. But it is important to understand the adumbration as part of the genuine being of the object. The adumbration is not appearance in a privative sense, as if the real object was somehow hidden "behind" such adumbrations. The object is rather actually there "in" them. Just never exhaustively.

$\mathbf{5}$

To intend the object, to discuss it, is to intend the synthesis or system of its adumbrations. This is both a temporal and an interpersonal synthesis. The same object can appear for me many times in many different ways. And the same object can appear for others in ways that it has not appeared for me. The object is "more than" any finite (past) set of such manifestations, but the object is **not** more than the "open totality" of all of its actual and possible manifestations. The object is an "infinite" synthesis, which is always "ajar" or "open to the future."

6

As I understand Husserl, he takes the stream to have an immanent and a transcendent component. The sensual "content" of the object is "in here" in a way that the logical

"form" of the object is not. Even though the logical component is experienced with (simply exists as fused with) the sensual content (indeed as the unity and meaning of that sensual component), this logical component refers beyond what is present (both temporally and spatially), beyond what is "in here."

How can we express this ? Logic is "deeper" than the speaking ego (this ego is one more transcendent/logical entity, after all). The subject, a normative/virtual entity, is "a function of language" (of logic.) Logic is "transpersonal" or "trans-perspectival." It is not a function of the individual speaking person, though individuals of course learn to participate in conversation, and carry the language with them in some sense, once trained to be able to do so.

7

I do not seek a "mystical" effect here. Though I do think it's strange to notice what might be called our "semantic field." We can express this in a mundane way as our sharing of a language. As language user, I am "delocalized." I intend the object in a sense that transcends me as entity or persona. The apple is intended as one that also shows this or that side to you, a side that I have not been shown.

8

Objects in the world are "between" us. We can safely presuppose this equiprimordial duo of world and language, for, without it, rationality is senseless anyway.

9

This presupposed coupling of world and language is a "space for assembly," an **onto-**logical forum. It is one of those structures, perhaps an especially crucial structure, that phenomenology foregroundingly describes.

10

Objects or entities are, I claim, temporal and interpersonal syntheses of adumbrations that are therefore theirs. The artichoke is not more than its leaves. We don't peel off the leaves to find the real artichoke. But objects are given in adumbrations. For an object to be given or appear as one adumbration is, simultaneously, its not being given and not appearing as any of its others adumbrations.

11

In spatial terms, we might say that aspects occlude or conceal one another, like sides of a coin. In terms of a personality, we might see the "nice side" of a person, but not *while* seeing their "cruel side."

12

For this reason, we can generalize the metaphor of aspect. We note that spatial objects show different aspects at different times. I can move around the object, to see another side of it, but this takes time. So I can also say that I am seeing different moments of an object that remains the same. The object as temporal synthesis is a synthesis or unification of these moments.

13

As the artichoke to its leaves, the object to its moments. The being or entity to its moments. Because the object transcends any particular moment, it "needs time" in order to show itself, be seen, be experienced and known. It is never finished offering itself. It is never fully present.

$\mathbf{14}$

We see then that a transcendent object is an object against a logically necessary background or horizon of time. My life is lived in what I might call a stream or river of experience, a flowing continuum of the-world-for-me. This continuum uncovers or spotlights entities always one moment or aspect at a time. And yet, as "logical subject," *I* glue these moments together, recognizing a different manifestation of the same object. My own face in the mirror is my same old face, and yet it is never strictly (in terms of sensual content) the same face.

15

What might be worth emphasizing is the relationship and perhaps even the identity between the logical and the transcendent. Is the logical aspect of the phenomenal stream exactly its transcendent aspect ?

16

Belief can be understood as the "meaning-structure" of "the-world-for-the-believer." A believer lives in his or her belief. Belief is deeper than truth. "True" is what we call beliefs we share. (To say all this is to express a belief, not a "truth" of course in any deep sense of truth. For the point is that "truth" never had any sense beyond the more primitive concept of belief.)

17

We've discussed particular entities, but the world itself has a special role, if only as the target of ontological foregrounding. The view of objects expressed in these notes fits into a larger vision of the world as a plurality of neutral phenomenal streams. Moments

of entities are embedded in these streams, and these streams are unrolling contextures or continua, each a flowing aspect of the same world. As the artichoke to its leaves, the world to these I-centered neutral phenomenal streams. In other words, the world only exists aspectually or perspectively. This view is explored in more detail in other notes.